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MOLECULAR BIOLOGY IN A DISTRIBUTED WORLD.
A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON SCIENTIFIC
PRACTICES AND THE HUMAN MIND
1. Kant’s theory of biology: a cognitive turnAlthough in his works Kant only occasionally refers to natural re-searchers and life scientists, he seems to be fully aware of themain findings and theoretical accounts about life and living beingsthat circulated in the eighteenth century. Moreover, Kant’sthoughts about organized beings, teleology and the opportunity ofa teleological approach in the life sciences still inspire scientistsand theorists, in a time pervasively dominated by Charles Dar-win’s evolutionary account, as exemplified by Dobzhansky’s fa-mous dictum that «nothing in biology makes sense except in thelight of evolution»1.Generally speaking, the interest of scholars in Kant’s theoryof biology has followed in recent years two main threads of re-search. On the one hand2, scholars have focused on Kant’sthoughts on organized beings to counteract a more and more evi-dent shortcoming in contemporary evolutionary theory, namely,the removal of the concept of organism, «disappeared with therise of the modern synthesis in evolutionary theory» and «re-placed with the categories of gene and population, since evolution
1 T. Dobzhansky, Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution, «TheAmerican Biology Teacher» 35 (1973), 3, pp. 125-129.2 See for instance M. Quarfood, Transcendental idealism and the organism: essays on Kant,Stockholm, Almquist & Wiksell, 2004; M. Quarfood, Kant on biological teleology: towards
a two-level interpretation, «Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedi-cal Sciences» 37 (2006), pp. 735-747; D.-M. Walsh, Organisms as natural purposes: the
contemporary evolutionary perspective,  «Studies in History and Philosophy of Science»37 (2006), 4, pp. 771-791; A.A. Cohen, A Kantian stance on teleology in biology, «SouthAfrican Journal of Philosophy» 26 (2007), 2, pp. 109-121; P. Huneman, Ch. Wolfe, Intro-duction to The concept of organism: historical, philosophical, scientific perspectives, «His-tory and Philosophy of the Life Sciences» 32 (2010), pp. 147-154.
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was defined as a process of change in allele frequencies within apopulation»3. In this sense, Kant’s account of biology has beentaken into consideration as a fundamental complement, able toadd an (according to many scholars) missing piece in the field ofcontemporary evolutionary theory, under the assumption of ageneral homogeneity or, at least, a compatibility between Kant’stheory of biology and Darwinian evolutionary biology.On the other hand, Breitenbach4, Ginsborg5 and others haveargued that Kant’s theory of biology can be informative to con-temporary life sciences precisely because it has nothing to do withDarwinian (empirical) evolution: it belongs to a meta-empiricallevel. In other words, in the frame of this second thread of re-search, scholars draw on Kant precisely because Kant’s theory inquestion and evolutionary biology situate themselves at two abso-lutely different levels of discourse.Both the first and the second thread, although adopting dif-ferent perspectives, largely converge on the same point: a seem-ingly crucial relationship or, even, dichotomy between Kant’s the-ory of biology and contemporary Darwinian biology, with particu-lar attention being given to the concepts of teleology, function, or-ganism, and their respective roles in scientific practice.In the present paper, we attempt to provide an alternative per-spective. Rather than asking what Kant’s theory of biology can add(if any) to contemporary evolutionary theory or how evolutionarytheory can benefit from a revival of interest in Kant’s teleologicalaccount, we focus our attention on the epistemology of the life sci-ences and, more in particular, on the increasingly influential prac-tices of molecular biology. Very generally speaking, molecular bio-logists “unravel the mystery of life” by identifying and elucidatingdifferent molecular mechanisms. It is fair to say, thus, that theconcept of mechanism plays a central role within the field, as anumber of philosophers have repeatedly remarked in recentyears6.
3 P. Huneman, Ch. Wolfe, Introduction to The concept of organism cit., p. 147.4 A. Breitenbach, Teleology in biology: a Kantian approach, «Kant Yearbook», 1 (2009),pp. 31-56.5 H. Ginsborg, Oughts without intentions: a Kantian account of biological functions, in I.Goy and E. Watkins (eds.), Kant’s theory of biology, Berlin-New York, De Gruyter, 2014,pp. 259-274.6 See, most notably, P. Machamer, L. Darden and C.F. Craver, Thinking about mechanism,«Philosophy of Science» 67 (2000), 1, pp. 1-25.
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Now, the main aim of our paper is, differently from the twomain interpretative threads indicated above, to trace a connectionbetween Kant’s theses about the so-called “peculiar” or special na-ture of the human mind (intellectus ectypus), advanced in his third
Critique, and some specific epistemological issues pertaining tothe research practice of contemporary molecular biology.In order to develop this argument, by examining theboundaries between Kant’s third Critique, cognitive sciences andepistemology of the life sciences, we will structure the presentpaper as follows: in Section 1, we will concentrate on §§ 76, 77,and the General remark on the teleology in the Critique of the
power of judgment, in which Kant describes how our (human)mind is structured and functions, drawing a thought-provokingcomparison between the human discursive intellect (intellectus
ectypus) and a hypothetical intuitive (divine) intellect (intellectus
archetypus). In Section 2, we will briefly delineate epistemology ofmolecular biology, paying particular attention to the notion of“distributed cognition” and its role in the research practice of mo-lecular biology itself and, additionally, bioinformatics. We will ask,in Section 3, how and to what extent it is possible to interpretKant’s intellectus archetypus as amechanicalmodel of the mind, byreferring especially to McLaughlin Mechanical explanation 7 and,to some degree Kant's Critique of teleology in biological explana-
tion 8. Finally, in Section 4, we will point out interesting ways howthis area can be further worked out, in particular, as far as Kant’sphilosophy of biology and its connections to his overall account ofthe human mind are concerned.
2. Ever since Kant: intellectus ectypus and intellectus archety-
pusIn two notoriously difficult sections of his third Critique (§§ 76and 77), Kant contrasts our discursive intellect with a logical pos-sibility of an intuitive intellect within the framework of generaldiscussion on the principle of purposiveness. In that sense, Kantwrites:
7 P. McLaughlin, Mechanical explanation in the “Critique of the teleological power of
judgement”, in I. Goy, E. Watkins (eds.), Kant’s theory of biology, Berlin-New York, DeGruyter, 2014, pp. 149-164.8 McLaughlin, P., Kant’s Critique of teleology in biological explanation. Antinomy and tele-
ology, New York, The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990.
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We would find no distinction between a natural mechanism and a tech-nique of nature, i.e., a connection to ends in it, if our understanding werenot of the sort that must go from the universal to the particular, and thepower of judgment can thus cognize no purposiveness in the particular,and hence make no determining judgments, without having a universallaw under which it can subsume the particular.9The distinction between mechanism and teleology and the firmassumption that there is no «hope that there may yet arise a New-ton who could make comprehensible even the generation of ablade of grass according to natural laws that no intention has or-dered»10, have in the special character of our (human) intellecttheir decisive rationale. «But if that is the case», Kant adds in § 77,then this idea of the “specialness” of our human understanding:must be based on the idea of a possible understanding other than thehuman one [...] so that one could say that certain products of nature, asfar as their possibility is concerned, must, given the particular constitu-tion of our understanding, be considered by us as intentional and gener-ated as ends [...], thus without denying that another (higher) understand-ing than the human one might be able to find the ground of the possibil-ity of such products of nature even in the mechanism of nature, i.e., in acausal connection for which an understanding does not have to be exclu-sively assumed as a cause. 11The distinction between the (human) discursive, image-dependentunderstanding (intellectus ectypus) and the logical possibility of asuperior, intuitive understanding is described, into more details,as follows: whereas the intellectus ectypus (our human under-standing) «goes from the analytical universal (of concepts) to theparticular (of the given empirical intuition), in which it deter-mines nothing with regard to the manifoldness of the latter, butmust expect this determination for the power of judgment fromthe subsumption of the empirical intuition (when the object is aproduct of nature) under the concept»12, the intellectus arche-
types, instead, «goes from the synthetically universal  (of the intui-tion of a whole as such) to the particular»13. Now, a few lines after
9 I. Kant, Critique of the power of judgment, ed. by P. Guyer, Cambridge, CambridgeUniversity Press, 2000, p. 274 [AA 5: 404]. References to the Akademie edition (AA), byvolume and page number, are reproduced in the margins of the 2000 Guyer and Mat-thews translation.10 Ibid., p. 271 [AA 5: 400].11 Ibid., p. 275 [AA 5: 405].12 Ibid., p. 276 [AA 5: 407].13 Ibid.
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this distinction, Kant goes further with his account by describingthe case of a “material whole” as it would appear to a non-human
intellectus archetypus:if we consider a material whole, as far as its form is concerned, as aproduct of the parts and of their forces and their capacity to combine bythemselves (including as parts other materials that they add to them-selves), we represent a mechanical kind of generation. But from thisthere arises no concept of a whole as an end, whose internal possibilitypresupposes throughout the idea of a whole on which even the constitu-tion and mode of action of the parts depends, which is just how we mustrepresent an organized body. But from this, as has just been shown, itdoes not follow that the mechanical generation of such a body is impos-sible; for that would be to say the same as that it is impossible (i.e., self-contradictory) to represent such a unity in the connection of the mani-fold for every understanding without the idea of that connection being atthe same time its generating cause, i.e., without intentional production.14In a nutshell, a significant “limitation” distinguishes the function-ing of the human understanding, and its cognitive performances.When it comes to the explanation of a particular part of nature,i.e., of so-called “organized”, living beings, we are cognitively con-strained to presuppose the idea of an end, «of a whole on whicheven the constitution and mode of action of the parts depends»15.A mechanical explanation of the biological entities seems not to bepossible, and a mechanical human mind, as far as its structure andfunctioning are concerned, seems not to be possible either. Thisidea lies at the heart of Kant’s characterization of the human un-derstanding.With this in mind, let’s turn now to the burgeoning researchfield of contemporary cognitive sciences. In other words, our lead-ing question will be the following one: what are the results fromdifferent areas of cognitive science telling us today about the na-ture and functioning of the human mind when faced scientificallywith highly complex systems, particularly, in the biosciences? Thenext section aims at responding to that issue.
3. Distributed cognitionAs a matter of fact, humans take their decisions and solve theirproblems relying on incomplete information: this is the way wegenerally accomplish our cognitive tasks in everyday contexts, al-
14 Ibid., pp. 277-278 [AA 5: 408], emphasis added.15 Ibid., p. 278 [AA 5: 408].
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ways exposed to the possibility of gaining new pieces of informa-tion and, therefore, of revising our previous decisions and resolu-tions16. Our cognition is bounded, in a sense that is apparently notso far from Kant’s idea of the “limitations” of human ectypus un-derstanding, as has been pointed out above.Now, some decisive developments in the research and prac-tice of the life sciences, particularly in the field of molecular biol-ogy (genetics, genomics and bioinformatics) make this standard
boundedness of the human cognition even more evident.It is true, as many scholars have noticed, that the accom-plishments of the Human Genome Project, with the rapid devel-opment of DNA sequencing techniques, have not unravelled all themysteries of human and non-human life, contrary to scientists’expectations. However, nobody can deny that, with the HGP, wehave entered a time of changes and revolutions that lasts up tocurrent times.Thanks to the astonishing advancements in DNA sequencingtechnology, scientists working in the fields of genetics, genomicsand bioinformatics – an interdisciplinary area of biological re-search that uses computer sciences, statistics and mathematics aspart of its methodology – have to deal with an unprecedentedamount of data17. Data must not only be gathered, fused and or-ganized in huge databases, but also analysed and interpreted inorder to discover new knowledge. Even one of the most commonresearch techniques in molecular biology, the so-called poly-merase chain reaction (PCR), used to amplify a single copy or afew copies of a piece of DNA, reproducing it billions of times andutilized on a daily basis in labs, e.g., for diagnosing diseases andidentifying viruses and bacteria, requires a large familiarity withdatabases and bioinformatics tools (particularly for the primerdesign phase).It is fair to say that researchers working today in the field of mo-lecular biology (with all its related sub-disciplines)needunprecedentedlyhigh skills in memory (where to go and search for information, usuallydealing with huge databases), learning (how to relate disparate pieces ofinformation), comprehension (understanding how to use the correspon-
16 See E. Bardone, Seeking chances: from biased rationality to distributed cognition, Hei-delberg-Berlin, Springer, 2011.17 See O.A. Kuchar, J. Reyes-Spindola, and M. Benaroch, Augmented cognition for bioin-
formatics problem solving, in Proceedings of the Augmented cognition International Con-
ference, NV, Las Vegas, 2005.
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ding databases); and decision making (what all this information in factmea-ns)18. In other words, scientists, when facing such a quantity ofdata, must heavily lean on their electronic supports, software andtools to accomplish their work, so that the quality of their scien-tific research would immediately drop down without them. Elec-tronic devices (such as databases and software products) are notoptional or ancillary instruments, but real scaffolds for scientificcognition. They make cognitive tasks easier or more efficient, tosuch a point that scientists would not be able to perform in thesame way (fast and smoothly) without them19.It is worth noticing that, according to Ronald N. Giere, whohas most thoroughly argued for a cognitive approach in the phi-losophical understanding of scientific practice, the vast majority ofcontemporary scientific research takes place in so-called distrib-
uted cognitive systems20. By focusing on the boundaries betweencognitive sciences and philosophy of science, Giere argues that so-me new developments within the area of cognitive sciences pro-vide a useful framework for rethinking general cognition in sci-ence. These new developments go under the label of “distributedcognition”, a framework that, according to Giere’s account,launches a bridge across the gap between constructivist (external-ist) and cognitivist (internalist) explanations of the ways in whichscientific research develops21.The “distributed cognition” framework, gradually emerging in thecognitive sciences during the past thirty years, can be traced backto different sources, among which we will just mention here, onthe one hand, the work done in the early 1980s by McClelland,Rumelhart and their associates in the Parallel Distributed Process-
18 Ibid.19 See Z. Liu, N. Nersessian, and J. Stasko, Distributed cognition as a theoretical framework
for information visualization, «IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graph-ics» 14 (2007), 6, pp. 1173-1180.20 See R.N. Giere, The problem of agency in scientific distributed cognitive systems, «Jour-nal of Cognition and Culture» 4 (2004), 3-4, pp. 759-774; R.N. Giere, Distributed cogni-
tion without distributed knowing, «Social Epistemology» 21 (2007), 3, pp. 313-320; R.N.Giere, B. Moffatt, Distributed cognition: where the cognitive and the social merge, «SocialStudies of Science» 33 (2003), pp. 301-310.21 See R.N. Giere, Scientific cognition as distributed cognition, in The cognitive basis of sci-
ence, P. Carruthers, S. Stitch and M. Siegal (eds.), Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 2002, pp. 285-299; R.N. Giere, The role of computation in scientific cognition,«Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence» 15 (2003), pp. 195-202.
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ing Group in San Diego, CA. This project focused on the similaritiesbetween networks of simple processors and the organisation andfunctioning of neural structures in the human brain. On the otherhand, there is a project in the abovementioned area, which is con-cerned with the ethnographic studies of traditional “pilotage” un-dertaken by Edwin Hutchins and associates at UCSD in the mid-1980s. Hutchins’ research, and his famous example of ship naviga-tion22, is especially worthy to be described here in more detail.Hutchins describes the ship’s navigation as an example of
distributed cognition, where multiple agents (sailors and shipmen)are coordinated in accomplishing multiple tasks. No one humanwould be physically able, alone and without the support of engi-neering devices, to do all the tasks that must be done to fulfil theoverall goal, in this case determining the position of a ship whileapproaching the port. Each sailor has his own task and uses spe-cific instruments in coordination with the partners. What is moreimportant, as Giere is emphasizing in his description of Hutchins’case study, none of the sailors has a grip on the problem as awhole, rather only on a limited set of aspects or component-parts.However, thanks to the distribution and coordination of differentcognitive sub-tasks, the main task or overall goal of safely enter-ing the port can be fully accomplished.There is a clear similarity between Hutchins’ case study, re-garding the traditional pilotage, and more recent research prac-tice in the biosciences, particularly in molecular biology and bioin-formatics.Today, massive scientific projects such as, for instance, theHuman Genome Project (already accomplished), the Human Epi-genome Project and the Human Microbiome Project (still under-way) involve thousands of scientific collaborators, with special-ized tasks and specific instruments at their disposal. None of thescientists working on the project can even aspire to get a grasp onthe process as a whole (namely, on its “end”, in a Kantian sense),but only on a restricted part of it. The cognitive tasks of gathering,fusing, organizing and interpreting bio-data are organized in a dis-
tributed way, adding locally new pieces of information withoutpresupposing or requiring a comprehensive understanding of thecorresponding research process in its entirety. Moreover, the re-search process is heavily based on, at all stages, external elec-
22 See E. Hutchins, Cognition in the wild, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1995.
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tronic devices such as computers, software products and elec-tronic databases.Bioinformaticians and molecular biologists obviously stilldeal with “animals” and “plants”, that is – in Kant’s main terminol-ogy – with “organized beings”, but the distributed nature of theircognitive tasks preclude any possibility, for them, to grasp thatpeculiar interdependence between the parts, or the “special” ar-rangements of the component-parts within the whole that, ac-cording to the third Critique, constitutes the main feature of ourknowledge of biological organisms in general. Bioinformaticsevokes today an idea of biological knowledge as a non-individualistic, extended and distributed process. How and towhat extent can these new advancements in the life sciences re-late to Kant’s basic characterization of the structure and function-ing of the human mind as described in Section 2 of the presentpaper?
4. Back to Kant: mechanism and distributed cognitionOver the course of the past years, philosopher of science PeterMcLaughlin has offered insightful and thought-provoking perspec-tives on the notions of mechanism and mechanical processes inthe Critique of the power of judgment, arguing that «many of Kant’sremarks suggest that he means by mechanism a specific kind ofcausal relation, namely the determination of a whole by itspart»23. According to McLaughlin, to explain a natural object me-chanically means to explain the way in which its parts determinethe object as a whole: «a mechanical explanation means the reduc-tion of a whole to the properties (faculties and forces) which theparts have “on their own”, that is, independently of the whole»24.Now, we have seen in Section 2 that the main feature of ourhuman discursive understanding is that it must presuppose awhole (as an end) in order to be able to make sense of biologicalentities and their behaviours. In other words, our understandingis such that the parts of an organism (its organs, for instance) canbe explained only by the reference to the whole to which they allare related. As the discursive and intuitive intellects are, Kant
23 P. McLaughlin, Mechanical explanation in the "Critique of the teleological power of
judgement" cit., p. 154.24 P. McLaughlin, Kant's Critique of teleology in biological explanation cit., p. 153; for acriticism of McLaughlin's position see, for instance, A. Breitenbach, Kant on causal
knowledge: causality, mechanism and reflective judgment, in Allen, Keith and Stoneham,Tom (eds.), Causation and modern philosophy, London, Routledge, 2011.
92 Mariagrazia Portera, Predrag Šustar
says, opposite to each other (see §§ 76 and 77 of the third Cri-
tique), we may conclude from this that the main feature of the in-
tellectus archetypus consists in being able to determine the wholeby its component-parts (instead of the parts being determined bythe whole, as our intellectus ectypus is constrained to do so). Inother words, as suggested by McLaughlin, we may conclude thatthe intellectus archetypus works mechanically. It seems to be theprototype of a mechanical model of the mind.While explicating into more detail his interpretation of thenotion of mechanism in Kant’s third Critique, McLaughlin also putsforward an example that turns out to be suitable and significantfor the approach advanced in the present paper. Namely, he re-marks that practical mechanics, as used in manufacturing, pre-supposes that the component-parts produced «will have preciselythose properties in the machine that they had before they wereput together to make the machine and that the parts of a machine,do not lose any properties when the machine is taken apart»25.The process highlighted by McLaughlin shows impressivesimilarities with what commonly happens within the field of bio-informatics and molecular biology. Researchers involved in mas-sive cognitive endeavours such as, as already mentioned, the pro-ject of human genome sequencing, fulfil tasks that have their ownproperties and value in themselves, all the more so as the “whole”to which these tasks in principle belong, is unattainable by thescientists themselves (considered as singular, individual minds).None of the bioinformaticians or molecular biologists working onthe project is able to gain a global vision of the research process asa whole, in its “material” unfolding. The Human Genome Project,as mentioned in Section 3, requires and witnesses a super-individual and mechanical (in Kant’s sense) form of cognition.This allows us to make the final step, drawing concludingremarks from what we have discussed so far.
5. Concluding remarksWe argue that contemporary bio-scientists, doing their researchin the cognitive distributed systems, heavily leaning on externalelectronic devices and with no possibility to get a comprehensiveview of the research process as a whole, may collectively count asa peculiar instantiation of Kant’s mechanical intellectus archety-
25 P. McLaughlin, Kant's Critique of teleology in biological explanation cit., p. 153.
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pus. A super-individual, distributed, collective, mechanical intel-
lectus, where the whole, as McLaughlin claims, is reduced to thecognitive faculties, which the corresponding parts have on theirown, i.e., independently of the whole.Organisms raise difficulties for any mechanistic account onlyunder the assumption that an intellectus ectypus is at work. How-ever, once it becomes clear that the life sciences allows a distribu-
tion of the cognitive tasks among several actors, both human andnon-human, and a substantial extension of the human cognition onexternal, non-human devices, could it be the case that Kant’s intel-
lectus archetypus comes down from its apparently unattainablepedestal?
